-
作者：McAfee, R. Preston; Mialon, Hugo M.; Mialon, Sue H.
作者单位：Emory University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We compare private and public enforcement of the antitrust laws in a simple strategic model of antitrust violation and lawsuit. The model highlights the tradeoff that private firms are initially more likely than the government to be informed about antitrust violations, but are also more likely to use the antitrust laws strategically, to the disadvantage of consumers. Assuming coupled private damages, if the court is sufficiently accurate, adding private enforcement to public enforcement always...
-
作者：Beshears, John; Choi, James J.; Laibson, David; Madrian, Brigitte C.
作者单位：Harvard University; Yale University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Revealed preferences are tastes that rationalize an economic agent's observed actions. Normative preferences represent the agent's actual interests. It sometimes makes sense to assume that revealed preferences are identical to normative preferences. But there are many cases where this assumption is violated. We identify five factors that increase the likelihood of a disparity between revealed preferences and normative preferences: passive choice, complexity, limited personal experience, third-...
-
作者：Casella, Alessandra; Gelman, Andrew
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：Referenda are becoming a common tool for public decision-making, and as reliance on direct democracy increases, so does the importance of giving representation to strongly held minority preferences. This paper discusses a very simple scheme that treats everybody symmetrically but gives weight to intense preferences: voters faced with a number of binary proposals are given one regular vote for each proposal plus a single additional bonus vote to cast as desired. Decisions are then taken accordi...
-
作者：Galiani, Sebastian; Gertler, Paul; Schargrodsky, Ernesto
作者单位：Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The decentralization of public services is a major feature of institutional innovation. The main argument in support of decentralization is that it brings decisions closer to the people, thereby alleviating information asymmetries and improving accountability. However, decentralization can also degrade service provision in poor communities that lack the ability to voice and defend their preferences. In this paper, we analyze the average and distributional effects of school decentralization on ...
-
作者：Gonzalez, Francisco M.; Neary, Hugh M.
作者单位：University of Calgary; University of British Columbia
摘要：Social conflict and slow growth are features of many developing economies. This paper considers the role institutions of property rights and conflict management can play in both achieving prosperity and mitigating conflict in these economies. We study how introducing conflict over economic distribution into an otherwise standard model of growth can shape optimal (second-best) taxation policy when diversionary activities cannot be taxed. In this context, we find that the maximization of economi...
-
作者：Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; National University of Singapore
摘要：Polarized interest groups compete to influence a decision-maker through monetary contributions. The decision-maker chooses a one-dimensional policy and has private information about his ideal point. Competition between interest groups under asymmetric information yields a rich pattern of equilibrium strategies and payoffs. Policies are systematically biased towards the decision-maker's ideal point and it may sometimes lead to a laissez-faire equilibrium where the decision-maker is freed from a...
-
作者：Engelhardt, Bryan; Rocheteau, Guillaume; Rupert, Peter
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; College of the Holy Cross; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：This paper extends the Pissarides [Pissarides, Christopher A. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Cambridge: MIT (2000)] model of the labor market to include crime and punishment A la Becker [Becker, Gary S. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. journal of Political Economy 76 (1968): 169-217]. All workers, irrespective of their labor force status, can commit crimes and the employment contract is determined optimally. The model is used to study, analytically and quantitatively, the effects ...
-
作者：Gathmann, Christina
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The paper analyzes the effects of tighter border control on the illegal crossing market between Mexico and the United States. Combining panel data on illegal migrants with enforcement statistics, the effects of enforcement are found to be moderate: prices of border smugglers ('coyotes') increased by only 17%, while the demand for smugglers has remained unchanged. Enforcement has however shifted illegal migrants to remote crossing places. Border crossing is now more time-intensive with higher p...
-
作者：Diamond, Peter
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
-
作者：Huizinga, Harry; Laeven, Luc
作者单位：Tilburg University; International Monetary Fund; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We model the opportunities and incentives generated by international tax differences for international profit shifting by multinationals. The model considers not only profit shifting arising from international tax differences between affiliates and parent companies, but also from tax differences between affiliates in different host countries. Our model yields the prediction that a multinational's profit shifting in a country depends on a weighted average of international tax rate differences b...
