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作者：Larrimore, Jeff; Mortenson, Jacob; Splinter, David
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：Using a panel of tax data, we follow individuals' earnings over business cycles. Compared to prior recessions, the Covid policy response and recovery were more progressive. Among workers starting in the bottom quintile, median real earnings including fiscal relief increased 66 percent in 2020-after the prior two recessions this measure decreased. This resulted from substantial Covid-era stimulus payments and unemployment insurance. With fiscal relief ending, bottom-quintile earnings in 2022 re...
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作者：Castillo, Marco; Petrie, Ragan; Wardell, Clarence
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Donating to charity requires time, effort and attention. If the costs to give are perceived to be large, charities may lose out on donations. We develop a nonparametric test for the presence of these general nuisance costs and conduct a large-scale field experiment to show that costs to give are sizable and impactful. Potential donors were offered a 5:1 fixed match if their donation met or exceeded a minimum amount (e.g. $1, $5 or $10). Absent nuisance costs, the probability of donating should...
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作者：Rubli, Adrian
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：In settings with inefficient public provision, expansions in low-cost private-market healthcare delivery may be welfare-improving by increasing access, but may be sacrificing on quality. I study the introduc-tion of retail clinics at private pharmacies in Mexico. I find that entry led to large declines in public-sector emergency room visits and a small but significant reduction in public clinic visits for relatively mild res-piratory infections. I also find a significant increase in public cli...
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作者：Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：We study committees that acquire information, deliberate, and vote. A member cares about statedependent decision payoffs and his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved. In such environments, members' internal reputations are based on deliberation patterns, while members' external reputations are based on the observed group decision. We find that either form of reputation concerns creates strategic complementarity among members' effort levels. Internal reputations create stronge...
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作者：Buettner, Thiess; Madzharova, Boryana; Zaddach, Orlando
作者单位：University of Erlangen Nuremberg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of an income tax credit for hard-to-tax consumer services on evasion of the value-added-tax (VAT). Based on the individual tax files of the universe of VAT payers in Germany, our analysis shows that harnessing incentives for consumers through tax credits fosters firms' compli-ance with VAT by bringing in an element of third-party reporting at the last VAT stage. Our results point at strong stimulating effects of the introduction of the tax credit on reported sal...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Rafey, Will
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We show that, in a model without commitment to future policies, geoengineering breakthroughs can have adverse environmental and welfare effects because they change the (equilibrium) carbon taxes. In our model, energy producers emit carbon, which creates a negative environmental externality, and may decide to switch to cleaner technology. A benevolent social planner sets carbon taxes without commitment. Higher future carbon taxes both reduce emissions given technology and encourage energy produ...
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作者：Goda, Gopi Shah; Soltas, Evan J.
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We show that Covid-19 illnesses and related work absences persistently reduce labor supply. Using an event study, we estimate that workers with week-long Covid-19 absences are 7 percentage points less likely to be in the labor force one year later compared to otherwise-similar workers who do not miss a week of work for health reasons. Our estimates suggest Covid-19 absences have reduced the U.S. labor force by approximately 500,000 people (0.2 percent of adults) and imply an average labor supp...
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作者：Kutscher, Macarena; Nath, Shanjukta; Urzua, Sergio
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper investigates whether the adoption of centralized school admission systems can alter within -school socio-economic diversity relative to decentralized settings. We take advantage of the largest school-admission reform implemented to date: Chile's SAS, which in 2016 replaced the country's decen-tralized system with a Deferred Acceptance algorithm. We exploit its sequential introduction across regions to quantify its heterogeneous impact on segregation. The empirical analysis is carrie...
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作者：Jeong, Dahyeon; Shenoy, Ajay; Zimmermann, Laura, V
作者单位：The World Bank; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：Governments and NGOs have invested heavily in fighting corruption by designing anti-poverty programs that maximize transparency and accountability. We analyze whether corruption is still widespread in the context of one such program, a massive make-work scheme in India where every job spell is posted publicly online. Linking millions of administrative job records to local election outcomes, we measure how many jobs local politicians self-deal. In the year after the election, winners of close e...
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作者：Armand, Alex; Coutts, Alexander; Vicente, Pedro C.; Vilela, Ines
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; York University - Canada; University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：Corruption is often harmful for economic development, yet it is difficult to measure due to its illicit nat-ure. We propose a novel corruption game to characterize the interaction between actual political leaders and citizens, and implement it in Northern Mozambique. Contrary to the game-theoretic prediction, both leaders and citizens engage in corruption. Importantly, corruption in the game is correlated with real -world corruption by leaders: citizens send bribes to leaders whom we observe a...
