De Jure versus De Facto transparency: Corruption in local public office in India

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jeong, Dahyeon; Shenoy, Ajay; Zimmermann, Laura, V
• 署名单位: The World Bank; University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104855
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: corruption; Self-dealing; TRANSPARENCY; Local politicians; Anti-poverty programs; Greasing the wheels

摘要

Governments and NGOs have invested heavily in fighting corruption by designing anti-poverty programs that maximize transparency and accountability. We analyze whether corruption is still widespread in the context of one such program, a massive make-work scheme in India where every job spell is posted publicly online. Linking millions of administrative job records to local election outcomes, we measure how many jobs local politicians self-deal. In the year after the election, winners of close elections receive 3 times as many workdays as losers and typical villagers. We find that corruption persists because of a gap between de jure and de facto transparency. Only when citizens have tools to access information in a timely manner does corruption eventually vanish. (c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.