Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104875
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Committee decision making; Reputation concerns; information acquisition; Strategic complements; peers; MARKETS

摘要

We study committees that acquire information, deliberate, and vote. A member cares about statedependent decision payoffs and his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved. In such environments, members' internal reputations are based on deliberation patterns, while members' external reputations are based on the observed group decision. We find that either form of reputation concerns creates strategic complementarity among members' effort levels. Internal reputations create stronger incentives to become informed than external reputations. Their strength grows in committee size; external reputations create no incentives in large committees. Finally, reputation concerns may relax participation constraints.(c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).