Measuring corruption in the field using behavioral games q

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Armand, Alex; Coutts, Alexander; Vicente, Pedro C.; Vilela, Ines
• 署名单位: Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; York University - Canada; University of London; Royal Holloway University London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104799
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: corruption; game; trust; Lab-in-the-field; CITIZEN; Political leader; incentives; BEHAVIOR; Elite capture

摘要

Corruption is often harmful for economic development, yet it is difficult to measure due to its illicit nat-ure. We propose a novel corruption game to characterize the interaction between actual political leaders and citizens, and implement it in Northern Mozambique. Contrary to the game-theoretic prediction, both leaders and citizens engage in corruption. Importantly, corruption in the game is correlated with real -world corruption by leaders: citizens send bribes to leaders whom we observe appropriating community money. In corrupt behavior, we identify an important trust dimension captured by a standard trust game.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.