Mirage on the horizon: Geoengineering and carbon taxation without commitment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acemoglu, Daron; Rafey, Will
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104802
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: Carbon tax; Geoengineering; environment; INNOVATION; time inconsistency

摘要

We show that, in a model without commitment to future policies, geoengineering breakthroughs can have adverse environmental and welfare effects because they change the (equilibrium) carbon taxes. In our model, energy producers emit carbon, which creates a negative environmental externality, and may decide to switch to cleaner technology. A benevolent social planner sets carbon taxes without commitment. Higher future carbon taxes both reduce emissions given technology and encourage energy producers to switch to cleaner technology. Geoengineering advances, which reduce the negative environmental effects of the existing stock of carbon, decrease future carbon taxes and thus discourage private investments in conven-tional clean technology. We characterize the conditions under which these advances diminish-rather than improve-environmental quality and welfare, and show that given current estimates of costs and environ-mental damages, these conditions are likely to be satisfied in our model.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.