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作者：Aridor, Guy; Che, Yeon-Koo; Salz, Tobias
作者单位：Northwestern University; Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Utilizing a novel dataset from an online travel intermediary, we study the effects of the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The opt-in requirement of GDPR resulted in a 12.5% drop in the intermediary-observed consumers, but the remaining consumers are trackable for a longer period of time. Our findings imply that privacy-conscious consumers exert privacy externalities on opt-in consumers, making them more predictable. Consistent with this finding, the average value of the remaini...
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作者：Smolin, Alex
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices.I characterize revenue-maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure rules. An optimal me...
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作者：Fershtman, Daniel; Szabadi, Bela; Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Charles River Associates; University of Basel
摘要：We study efficient resolution of partnership disputes in which, departing from the partnership dissolution literature, dissolution need not be efficient. We characterize which disputes can be resolved efficiently under both one- and two-sided private information, and show that unless a partnership is sufficiently ineffective, efficient resolution is impossible. We propose simple dispute-resolution procedures implementing the efficient outcome whenever possible. Finally, we characterize second-...
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作者：Qiu, Y. J. Jeff
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：Funding is important for research. However, research funding may suffer from the Matthew effect: the more researchers already have, the more they will be given. I develop an empirical framework to study how the National Institutes of Health (NIH) could allocate funding in a dynamically optimal manner by balancing funds between young and veteran principal investigators (PIs). I find that the discount factor that rationalizes NIH's funding behavior is about 0.75, implying it may underfund young ...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Jeon, Doh-Shin
作者单位：Michigan State University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We investigate how platform market power affects platforms' design choices in ad-funded two-sided markets, where platforms may find it optimal to charge zero price on the consumer side and extract surplus on the advertising side. We consider design choices affecting both sides in opposite ways and compare private incentives with social incentives. Platforms' design biases depend crucially on whether they can charge any price on the consumer side. We apply the framework to technology adoption, ...
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作者：Gautier, Pieter; Hu, Bo; Watanabe, Makoto
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Fudan University; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics; Kyoto University
摘要：This article develops a model in which market structure is determined endogenously by the choice of intermediation mode. There are two representative modes of intermediation that are widely used in real-life markets: one is a middleman mode where an intermediary purchases inventory from the wholesale market and resells to buyers; the other is a market-making mode where an intermediary offers a platform for buyers and sellers to meet and trade. We show that a marketmaking middleman, who adopts ...
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作者：Kuvalekar, Aditya; Ramos, Joao; Schneider, Johannes
作者单位：University of Essex; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：Agents, some with a bias, decide between undertaking a risky project and a safe alternative based on information about the project's efficiency. Only a part of that information is verifiable. Unbiased agents want to undertake only efficient projects, but biased agents want to undertake any project. If the project causes harm, a court examines the verifiable information, forms a belief about the agent's type, and decides the punishment. Tension arises between deterring inefficient projects and ...
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作者：Cox, Christian
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying affects both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then I structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.837 billion (3.22%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and f...
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作者：Pan, Siqi; Zhao, Xin
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We investigate the role of sellers' commitment power in discouraging consumer search. Theoretically, lack of commitment power transforms sellers' search-deterring claims into cheap talk, eliminating sellers' ability to deter search in some market environments. However, our experiments show buyers' search decisions are significantly affected by sellers' cheap talk. When future prices are not adjustable, sellers falsely claim exploding offers to deter search. When future prices are adjustable, s...
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作者：Tsai, Hsin-Tien
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：This research studies the effects of mortgage subsidies and asymmetric information in the US mortgage market. I exploit discontinuities in interest rates generated by pricing rules and find patterns consistent with advantageous selection. I estimate an industry model that highlights the relationship between mortgage subsidies, intermediary lenders' incentives, and borrowers' advantageous selection. The model shows that mortgage subsidies enable advantageous selection, creating a deadweight los...
