Disclosure and pricing of attributes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Smolin, Alex
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12451
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 570-597
• 关键词: simple economics; INFORMATION; DESIGN; persuasion

摘要

A monopolist sells an object characterized by multiple attributes. A buyer can be one of many types, differing in their willingness to pay for each attribute. The seller can provide arbitrary attribute information in the form of a statistical experiment. To screen different types, the seller offers a menu of options that specify information prices, experiments, and object prices.I characterize revenue-maximizing menus. All experiments belong to a class of linear disclosure rules. An optimal menu may be nondiscriminatory. The analysis highlights the importance of demand microstructure and the benefits of information control in trade settings.