The wrong kind of information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kuvalekar, Aditya; Ramos, Joao; Schneider, Johannes
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12440
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 360-384
• 关键词: character evidence; ECONOMICS

摘要

Agents, some with a bias, decide between undertaking a risky project and a safe alternative based on information about the project's efficiency. Only a part of that information is verifiable. Unbiased agents want to undertake only efficient projects, but biased agents want to undertake any project. If the project causes harm, a court examines the verifiable information, forms a belief about the agent's type, and decides the punishment. Tension arises between deterring inefficient projects and a chilling effect on using the unverifiable information. Improving the unverifiable information always increases overall efficiency, but improving the verifiable information may reduce efficiency.