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作者：Palikot, Emil; Pietola, Matias
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Pay-for-delay patent settlements, in which the incumbent patentee pays a potential entrant to withdraw a patent challenge and stay out of the market, cost patients and taxpayers billions of dollars in higher pharmaceutical prices. We show that in markets with one incumbent and several entrants, the possibility of conditioning such settlements on litigation outcomes against other entrants results in the exclusion of all entrants from the market. When conditional contracts are infeasible, the in...
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作者：Preuss, Marcel
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：In many search markets, some consumers search to learn both the price and their willingness-to-pay whereas others search only to learn prices. When a seller can track indicators of the likelihood that consumers already know their willingness-to-pay, I show that price discrimination reduces profits and welfare relative to uniform pricing if search costs are small, but may increase both if search costs are large. The analysis also applies to sequential search if learning causes the likelihood th...
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作者：Engelmann, Dirk; Frank, Jeff; Koch, Alexander K.; Valente, Marieta
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Aarhus University; Universidade do Minho
摘要：Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow second-chance offers (the runner-up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second-chance offers reduces bids; (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default; (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default wi...
