Efficient resolution of partnership disputes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fershtman, Daniel; Szabadi, Bela; Wasser, Cedric
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Charles River Associates; University of Basel
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12450
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 543-569
• 关键词: common-value partnerships; participation constraints; PROPERTY-RIGHTS; dissolution; mechanisms; benefits; OWNERSHIP; auctions; COSTS

摘要

We study efficient resolution of partnership disputes in which, departing from the partnership dissolution literature, dissolution need not be efficient. We characterize which disputes can be resolved efficiently under both one- and two-sided private information, and show that unless a partnership is sufficiently ineffective, efficient resolution is impossible. We propose simple dispute-resolution procedures implementing the efficient outcome whenever possible. Finally, we characterize second-best mechanisms when efficient resolution is impossible and private information is one sided.