Lobbying for government appropriations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cox, Christian
• 署名单位: University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12447
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 443-483
• 关键词: political connections; procurement contracts; market-structure; rent-seeking; COMPETITION; models; entry; equilibria; DIRECTORS; returns

摘要

This article investigates the effect of lobbying on government contract allocation. I consider how lobbying affects both total contract spending and the distribution of contracts between firms. I solve a novel contest model which incorporates these two effects, and then I structurally estimate it using a panel of federal contractors. The results suggest that lobbying increases contract spending by $8.837 billion (3.22%) per year. However, its effects on the observed contract distribution and firm revenues are relatively small. Lastly, I find that increasing competition in procurement generally results in less lobbying.