Commitment and cheap talk in search deterrence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pan, Siqi; Zhao, Xin
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; University of International Business & Economics
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12439
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 325-359
• 关键词: exploding offers; preferences; lies; deception; promises; aversion; people; size

摘要

We investigate the role of sellers' commitment power in discouraging consumer search. Theoretically, lack of commitment power transforms sellers' search-deterring claims into cheap talk, eliminating sellers' ability to deter search in some market environments. However, our experiments show buyers' search decisions are significantly affected by sellers' cheap talk. When future prices are not adjustable, sellers falsely claim exploding offers to deter search. When future prices are adjustable, sellers falsely claim low future prices to lure consumers to return after search and exploit these captive consumers with subsequent price hikes. A behavioral model with naive buyers explains our experimental findings.