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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
作者单位：University of Surrey; University of Vienna
摘要：In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equili...
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作者：Bloise, G.; Polemarchakis, H.; Vailakis, Y.
作者单位：Yeshiva University; Roma Tre University; University of Warwick; University of Glasgow
摘要：We show that debt is sustainable at a competitive equilibrium based solely on the reputation for repayment; that is, even without collateral or legal sanctions available to creditors. In an incomplete asset market, when the rate of interest falls recurrently below the rate of growth of the economy, self-insurance is more costly than borrowing, and repayments on loans are enforced by the implicit threat of loss of the risk-sharing advantages of debt contracts. Private debt credibly circulates a...
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作者：Marx, Philip; Schummer, James
作者单位：Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; Northwestern University
摘要：We consider the pricing problem of a platformthat matches heterogeneous agents using match-contingent fees. Absent prices, agents on the short side of such markets capture relatively greater surplus than those on the long side (Ashlagi et al. 2017). Nevertheless we show that the platform need not bias its price allocation toward either side. With independently drawn preferences, optimal price allocation decisions are independent of market size or imbalance; furthermore, changes in the optimal ...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Chambers, Christopher P.; Healy, Paul J.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Georgetown University
摘要：A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into types, and the planner wants only to elicit the agent's type. We first assume that beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a space of types is elicitable if and only if each type is defined by what the agent would choose from some list of menus. If beliefs are objective, then additional type spaces can be elicited, though a convex...
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作者：Garrett, Daniel F.
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimally structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does know that the principal knows them. We provide, in particular, tight bounds on the principal's expected benefit from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the agent's expected rents. We thus show how economically relevant predicti...
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作者：Kumar, Ujjwal; Roy, Souvik; Sen, Arunava; Yadav, Sonal; Zeng, Huaxia
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Umea University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. The type graph for a voter is a graph whose vertices are the possible types of the voter. Two vertices are connected by an edge in the graph if the associated types are neighbors. A social choice function is locally strategy-proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresentation to a type that is a neighbor of her true type. A social choice function is strategy-proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresenta...
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作者：Bonkoungou, Somouaoga; Nesterov, Alexander
作者单位：University of Lausanne; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：Dozens of school districts and college admissions systems around the world have reformed their admissions rules in recent years. As the main motivation for these reforms, the policymakers cited the strategic flaws of the rules in place: students had incentives to game the system. However, after the reforms, almost none of the new rules became strategy-proof. We explain this puzzle. We show that the rules used after the reforms are less prone to gaming according to a criterion called strategic ...
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作者：Ceron, Federica; Gonzalez, Stephane
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2
摘要：We axiomatically study voting rules without making any assumption on the ballots that voters are allowed to cast. In this setting, we characterize the family of endorsement rules, which includes approval voting and the plurality rule, via the imposition of three normative conditions. The first condition is the well known social-theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, unbiasedness, roughly requires social outcomes not to be biased toward particular candidates or voters; the last one...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Queensland
摘要：The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit-free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotic...
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作者：Baillon, Aurelien; Xu, Yan
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Vienna
摘要：This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms-top-flop and threshold betting-to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents' private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide microeconomic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other ...
