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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hongyi
摘要：We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full separation can always be supported in equilibrium, partial or complete pooling is optimal if the receiver's decision-making is highly responsive to information. In this case, the receiver's decision-making is disciplined by pooling states where she is most temp...
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作者：Pomatto, Luciano
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：Predictions about the future are commonly evaluated through statistical tests. As shown by recent literature, many known tests are subject to adverse selection problems and cannot discriminate between forecasters who are competent and forecasters who are uninformed but predict strategically. We consider a framework where forecasters' predictions must be consistent with a paradigm, a set of candidate probability laws for the stochastic process of interest. This paper presents necessary and suff...
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作者：Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Nichifor, Alexandru; Ostrovsky, Michael; Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Melbourne; Stanford University; University of Cologne
摘要：In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two-sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully substitutable and satisfy the Laws of Aggregate Supply and Demand. In the special case of trading networks with transferable utility, an outcome is consistent with competitive equilibrium if and only if it is...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
摘要：We model an individual who wants to learn about a state of the world. The individual has a prior belief and has data that consist of multiple forecasts about the state of the world. Our key assumption is that the decision maker identifies explanations that could have generated this data and among these focuses on those that maximize the likelihood of observing the data. The decision maker then bases her final prediction about the state on one of these maximum likelihood explanations. We show t...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：I consider multiround cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium distribution of lies aggregated over all possible realizations of the states. The approach is used to shed light on when the full truth is almost surely elicited, and when multiple lies can arise in equ...
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作者：Heidhues, Paul; Koszegi, Botond; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Yale University
摘要：We establish convergence of beliefs and actions in a class of one-dimensional learning settings in which the agent's model is misspecified, she chooses actions endogenously, and the actions affect how she misinterprets information. Our stochastic-approximation-based methods rely on two crucial features: that the state and action spaces are continuous, and that the agent's posterior admits a one-dimensional summary statistic. Through a basic model with a normal-normal updating structure and a g...
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作者：Lu, Jay
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We introduce a model of random ambiguity aversion. Choice is stochastic due to unobserved shocks to both information and ambiguity aversion. This is modeled as a random set of beliefs in the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). We characterize the model and show that the distribution of ambiguity aversion can be uniquely identified from binary choices. A novel stochastic order on random sets is introduced that characterizes greater uncertainty aversion under stochasti...
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作者：Guo, Yingni; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We consider a platform that provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for miscalibration, and show how this equilibrium depends on the miscalibration cost: when the miscalibration cost is low, the platform uses more distant forecasts and the customer is less responsive to the platform'...
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作者：Pei, Harry
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents, but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest equilibrium payoff and construct equilibria that attain this payoff. Since the patient player's Stackelberg action is mixed and motivating the lowest-benefit type to play mixed actions is costly, every type's ...
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作者：Miao, Jianjun; Wu, Jieran; Young, Eric R.
作者单位：Boston University; Zhejiang University; University of Virginia
摘要：We provide a production-based asset pricing model with dispersed information and small deviations from full rational expectations. In the model, aggregate output and equity prices depend on the higher-order beliefs about aggregate demand and individual stochastic discount factors. We prove that equity price volatility becomes arbitrarily large as the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks diverges to infinity due to the interaction of signal extraction with idiosyncratic trading decisions, while a...
