Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
• 署名单位: University of Surrey; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3967
• 发表日期: 2021-07-01
• 页码: 1055-1093
• 关键词: Large games; pure strategy; Nash equilibrium; generic property

摘要

In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players), we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.