Simple bets to elicit private signals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baillon, Aurelien; Xu, Yan
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Vienna
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4343
• 发表日期: 2021-07-01
• 页码: 777-797
• 关键词: Bets; private signals; Bayesian game; elicitation

摘要

This paper introduces two simple betting mechanisms-top-flop and threshold betting-to elicit unverifiable information from crowds. Agents are offered bets on the rating of an item about which they received a private signal versus that of a random item. We characterize conditions for the chosen bet to reveal the agents' private signal even if the underlying ratings are biased. We further provide microeconomic foundations of the ratings, which are endogenously determined by the actions of other agents in a game setting. Our mechanisms relax standard assumptions of the literature, such as common prior, and homogeneous and risk neutral agents.