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作者：Eilat, Ran; Eliaz, Kfir; Mu, Xiaosheng
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Princeton University
摘要：Modern information technologies make it possible to store, analyze, and trade unprecedented amounts of detailed information about individuals. This has led to public discussions on whether individuals' privacy should be better protected by restricting the amount or the precision of information that is collected by commercial institutions on their participants. We contribute to this discussion by proposing a Bayesian approach to measure loss of privacy in a mechanism. Specifically, we define th...
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作者：Kushnir, Alexey, I; Lokutsievskiy, Lev, V
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Russian Academy of Sciences; Steklov Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences
摘要：We provide sufficient conditions for a monotone function with a finite set of outcomes to be cyclically monotone. Using these conditions, we show that any monotone function defined on the domain of gross substitutes is cyclically monotone. The result also extends to the domain of generalized gross substitutes and complements.
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Rozen, Kareen
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Bounded rationality theories are typically characterized over exhaustive data sets. We develop a methodology to understand the empirical content of such theories with limited data, adapting the classic revealed-preference approach to new forms of revealed information. We apply our approach to an array of theories, illustrating its versatility. We identify theories and data sets testable in the same elegant way as rationality, and theories and data sets where testing is more challenging. We sho...
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作者：Li, Fei; Norman, Peter
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce informativeness in equilibrium and results in a more informative equilibrium in the case of two states. Moreover, with the exception of the first sender, it is without loss of generality to let each sender move on...
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作者：Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study intermediaries who seek to maximize gains from trade in bilateral negotiations. Intermediaries are players: they cannot commit to act against their objective function and deny, in some cases, trade they believe to be beneficial. This impairs their ability to assist the parties relative to conventional mechanisms. We analyze this limited commitment environment as a standard mechanism design problem with an additional credibility constraint, requiring that every outcome be interim-optim...
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作者：Kostadinov, Rumen
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：I study a repeated principal-agent game with long-term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation contracts are designed to punish deviations in noncontractible behavior. If the equilibrium actions are observed, these contra...
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作者：Myerson, Roger B.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services, which could be efficiently managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are appointed by the ruler of a centralized autocracy. The ruler might prefer to retain an official who diverted resources from public services but contributed part to benefit the ruler. The autocratic ruler would value better public services only when residents reduce taxable investments, which become unprofitable without ...
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作者：Li, Yunan
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget-constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare-maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two-stage scheme. First, agents report their budgets, receive cash transfers, and decide whether to enter a lottery over the good. Second, recipients of the good can sell it on a resale market but must pay a sales tax. Low-budget agents receive a hi...
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作者：Loisel, Olivier
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：In locally linearized dynamic stochastic rational-expectations models, I introduce the concepts of feasible paths (paths on which the policy instrument can be expressed as a function of the policymaker's observation set) and implementable paths (paths that can be obtained, in a minimally robust way, as the unique local equilibrium under a policy-instrument rule consistent with the policymaker's observation set). I show that, for relevant observation sets, the optimal feasible path under moneta...
