A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne; University of Queensland
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3311
• 发表日期: 2021-07-01
• 页码: 943-978
• 关键词: Deficit free; dominant strategy mechanisms; double clock auctions; individual rationality; multidimensional types; privacy preservation; reserve prices; VCG mechanism

摘要

The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit-free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency is achieved by estimating demand and supply using information from the bids of traders that have dropped out and following a tatonnement process that adjusts the clock prices based on the estimates.