Constrained preference elicitation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Azrieli, Yaron; Chambers, Christopher P.; Healy, Paul J.
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE4208
• 发表日期: 2021-05-01
• 页码: 507-538
• 关键词: Elicitation; incentive compatibility; random mechanisms; c7; D8

摘要

A planner wants to elicit information about an agent's preference relation, but not the entire ordering. Specifically, preferences are grouped into types, and the planner wants only to elicit the agent's type. We first assume that beliefs about randomization are subjective, and show that a space of types is elicitable if and only if each type is defined by what the agent would choose from some list of menus. If beliefs are objective, then additional type spaces can be elicited, though a convexity condition must be satisfied. These results remain unchanged when we consider a setting with multiple agents.