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作者：Dogan, Battal; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：University of Bristol; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We investigate efficient and minimally unstable Pareto improvements over the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism-a popular school choice mechanism that is stable but not efficient. We show that there is no Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism that is minimally unstable among efficient assignments when the stability comparison is based on counting the number of blocking pairs. Our main result characterizes the priority profiles for which there exists a Pareto improvement over the DA assignme...
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作者：Manzano, Carolina; Vives, Xavier
作者单位：Universitat Rovira i Virgili; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：We analyze a divisible good uniform-price auction that features two groups, each with a finite number of identical bidders, who compete in demand schedules. In the linear-quadratic-normal framework, this paper presents conditions under which the unique equilibrium in linear demands exists and derives novel comparative statics results that highlight the interaction between payoff and information parameters with asymmetric groups. We find that the strategic complementarity in the slopes of trade...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision maker. We depart from most of the previous literature by assuming that the transfers cannot depend on the realized state or on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The contract thus has to induce the experts to monitor each other by making the transfers contingent on the entire vector of reports. We characterize the least costly contract that implements any given vector ...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir; Fershtman, Daniel; Rozen, Kareen
作者单位：Brown University; Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Each agent privately learns whether he is qualified for the task. An agent wishes to be chosen independently of qualification and chooses whether to apply for the task. The principal wishes to appoint the most qualified agent and chooses which agent to assign as a function of the public history of profits. We fully characterize when the principal's first-best payoff is attainable in equilibrium and identify a simple strategy...
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作者：Schlag, Karl H.; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of St Andrews
摘要：We study sequential search without priors. Our interest lies in decision rules that are close to being optimal under each prior and after each history. We call these rules robust. The search literature employs optimal rules based on cutoff strategies, and these rules are not robust. We derive robust rules and show that their performance exceeds 1/2 of the optimum against binary independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) environments and 1/4 of the optimum against all i.i.d. environments....
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We provide an equilibrium framework for modeling the behavior of an agent who holds a simplified view of a dynamic optimization problem. The agent faces a Markov decision process, where a transition probability function determines the evolution of a state variable as a function of the previous state and the agent's action. The agent is uncertain about the true transition function and has a prior over a set of possible transition functions; this set reflects the agent's (possibly simplified) vi...
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作者：Kreps, David M.; Schachermayer, Walter
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Vienna
摘要：We examine the connection between discrete-time models of financial markets and the celebrated Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) continuous-time model in which markets are complete. Suppose that (a) the probability law of a sequence of discrete-time models converges to the law of the BSM model and (b) the largest possible one-period step in the discrete-time models converges to zero. We prove that, under these assumptions, every bounded and continuous contingent claim can be asymptotically synthesize...
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作者：Mueller-Frank, Manuel; Neri, Claudia
作者单位：University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：We analyze boundedly rational learning in social networks within binary action environments. We establish how learning outcomes depend on the environment (i.e., informational structure, utility function), the axioms imposed on the updating behavior, and the network structure. In particular, we provide a normative foundation for quasi-Bayesian updating, where a quasi-Bayesian agent treats others' actions as if they were based only on their private signal. Quasi-Bayesian updating induces learnin...
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作者：Siga, Lucas; Mihm, Maximilian
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies a property of information-the betweenness property-that is both necessary and sufficient for information aggregation. The characterization provides novel predictions about equilibrium prices in complex, multidimensional environments.
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作者：Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi
作者单位：Universidad de Chile; Xiamen University; University Diego Portales
摘要：Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability over time and communicates to the principal. We formulate learning delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning gives ri...
