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作者：Akin, Sumeyra
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is floor respecting stable if there is no coalition of doctors and hospitals that can propose an alternative matching that is feasible and...
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作者：Baumann, Leonie
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：This paper proposes a game of weighted network formation in which each agent has a limited resource to form links of possibly different intensities with other agents and to use for private purposes. We show that every equilibrium is either reciprocal or nonreciprocal. In a reciprocal equilibrium, any two agents invest equally in the link between them. In a nonreciprocal equilibrium, agents are partitioned into concentrated and diversified agents, and a concentrated agent is only linked to dive...
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作者：Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Harvard University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats against one another. Applications of the value in economics have been rare, at least in part because the existing definition (for games with more than two players) consists of an ad hoc scheme that does no...
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作者：Manea, Mihai
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We investigate how information goods are priced and diffused over links in a network. A new equivalence relation between nodes captures the effects of network architecture and locations of sellers on the division of profits, and characterizes the topology of competing (and potentially overlapping) diffusion paths. Sellers indirectly appropriate profits over intermediation chains from buyers in their equivalence classes. Links within the same class constitute bottlenecks for information diffusi...
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作者：Miller, Alan D.
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：I introduce a model of shareholder voting. I describe and provide characterizations of three families of shareholder voting rules: ratio rules, difference rules, and share majority rules. The characterizations rely on two key axioms: merger consistency, which requires consistency in voting outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers, and reallocation invariance, which requires the shareholder voting rule to be immune to certain manipulative techniques used by shareholders to hide their ownershi...
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作者：Brandenburger, Adam; Danieli, Alexander; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：New York University; New York University; NYU Shanghai; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Arizona
摘要：The epistemic conditions of rationality and mth-order strong belief of rationality (RmSBR; Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)) formalize the idea that players engage in contextualized forward-induction reasoning. This paper characterizes the behavior consistent with RmSBR across all type structures. In particular, in a class of generic games, R(m-1)SBR is characterized by a new solution concept we call an m-best response sequence (m-BRS). Such sequences are an iterative version of extensive-for...
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作者：Kocherlakota, Narayana R.
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：I study a class of macroeconomic models in which all firms can costlessly choose any price at each date from an interval (indexed to last period's price level) that includes a positive lower bound. I prove three results that are valid for any such half-closed interval (regardless of how near zero the left endpoint is). First, given any output sequence that is uniformly bounded from above by the moneyless equilibrium output level, that bounded output sequence is an equilibrium outcome for a (po...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Robson, Arthur
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Simon Fraser University
摘要：Our understanding of risk preferences can be sharpened by considering their evolutionary basis. The existing literature has focused on two sources of risk: idiosyncratic risk and aggregate risk. We introduce a new source of risk-heritable risk-in which there is a positive correlation between the fitness of a newborn agent and the fitness of her parent. Heritable risk was plausibly common in our evolutionary past and it leads to a strictly higher growth rate than the other sources of risk. We s...
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作者：Horan, Sean
作者单位：Universite de Montreal
摘要：Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats: the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features-history-independence and persistence-are common in legislative settings. I then characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize the rules...
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作者：Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be decorrelated to produce a payoff-equivalent SPE of the original game. As a corollary, we provide an alternative route to a result of He and Sun...
