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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We study static binary coordination games with random utility played on networks. In equilibrium, each agent chooses an action only if a fraction of her neighbors choosing the same action is higher than an agent-specific i.i.d. threshold. A fuzzy convention x is a profile where (almost) all agents choose the high action if their threshold is smaller than x and the low action otherwise. The random-utility (RU) dominant outcome x* is a maximizer of an integral of the distribution of thresholds. ...
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作者：Mitkov, Yuliyan
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：I endogenize the probability of self-fulfilling outcomes in a game where the only uncertainty comes from extrinsic sunspots. There is a group of players wishing to coordinate on the same action and another player-the regime defender-whose action affects the payoff from coordination. The coordinating players' actions can be based on a sunspot state, which, unlike in the classic sunspot approach, is observed with a small, idiosyncratic noise (a private sunspot). I show how private sunspots, comb...
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作者：Vellodi, Nikhil
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：I study the impact of consumer reviews on the incentives for firms to participate in the market. I develop a model of endogenous entry in which firms produce goods of heterogeneous, unknown quality. Consumers engage in directed search, and prices are exogenously fixed. A rater uses consumer reviews to construct firm-specific ratings that are informative of quality and help consumers direct their search. The main insight of the paper is that suppressing the reviews of highly-rated firms strengt...
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作者：Combe, Julien; Nora, Vladyslav; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Nazarbayev University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents who have to be assigned items at each date. When the social planner can only elicit ordinal agents' preferences, we prove that under a mild regularity assumption, incentive compatible and ordinally efficient allocation rules coincide with spot mechanisms. The latter specify virtual prices for items at each date and, for each agent, randomly select a budget of virtual money at the beginning of...
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作者：Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：I study t & acirc;tonnement processes in a matching market without transfers. In each period, schools set cutoffs, i.e., the preference ranks of the least preferred students they are willing to admit, and students accept their most preferred offers. Cutoffs are adjusted on the basis of demand-supply imbalances. A school's adjustment from one period to the next is moderate if it is bounded by the most recently observed imbalance at that school. I show that for any period in which all schools ad...
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作者：Wong, Yu Fu
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper studies how a forward-looking decision maker experiments on unknown alternatives of correlated utilities. The utilities are modeled by a Brownian motion such that similar alternatives yield similar utilities. Experimentation trades off between the continuation value of exploration and the opportunity cost of exploitation. The optimal strategy is to continuously explore unknown alternatives and then exploit the best known alternative when the one being explored is found to be suffici...
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作者：Rosenthal, Maxwell
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper studies a moral hazard problem in which the principal does not know the agent's beliefs about the output generating process. The agent is risk neutral, transfers are subject to limited liability, and the principal evaluates contracts according to their worst-case payoff against a rich set of plausible agent beliefs. With common knowledge of the relationship between effort and expected output, optimal contracts are of the form w(y)=max(alpha y + beta,0). With or without common knowle...
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作者：Finster, Simon; Goldberg, Paul W.; Lock, Edwin
作者单位：Johannes Kepler University Linz; University of Oxford; University of London; King's College London
摘要：In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense or maximize the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a notion of utilitarian efficiency that respects buyers' demands and budgets. Our main contribution establishes that when buyers have linear valuations, competitive equilibrium prices are unique and revenue-op...
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作者：Principi, Giulio; Wakker, Peter P.; Wang, Ruodu
作者单位：New York University; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Waterloo
摘要：Comonotonicity (same variation) of random variables minimizes hedging possibilities and has been widely used, e.g., in Gilboa and Schmeidler's ambiguity models. This paper investigates anticomonotonicity (opposite variation (AC)), the natural counterpart to comonotonicity. It minimizes leveraging rather than hedging possibilities. Surprisingly, AC restrictions of several traditional axioms do not give new models. Instead, they strengthen the foundations of existing classical models: (a) linear...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Rehbeck, John
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Models of stochastic choice typically use conditional choice probabilities given menus as the primitive for analysis, but in the field these are often hard to observe. We consider the case where an analyst has access to a marginal stochastic choice dataset containing the marginal distributions of available menus and of choices, but not to conditional choice frequencies. The Random Utility Model (RUM) has no testable implications for such datasets, but any restriction on the domain of feasible ...
