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作者：Atakan, Alp; Richter, Michael; Tsur, Matan
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Bristol
摘要：We study markets where heterogeneous agents first make investment decisions and then engage in a costly search to form productive matches. The trading process is a random search and bargaining with explicit search costs. Despite potential hold-up and matching problems, we prove that the constrained efficient allocation is an equilibrium: the agents' private incentives to invest and to accept/reject potential partners as they search are perfectly aligned with the social benefit. Furthermore, we...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of utilities that render a given allocation Pareto optimal. We show that a candidate allocation is efficient for some utilities consistent with the choice data if and only if it is efficient for an incomplete relation derived from the revealed preference relations...
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作者：Galichon, Alfred; Samuelson, Larry; Vernet, Lucas
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Yale University; European Central Bank; Bank of France
摘要：We introduce a notion of substitutability for correspondences and establish a monotone comparative static result. More precisely, we introduce the notions of unified gross substitutes and nonreversingness and show that if Q:P paired right arrows Q is a supply correspondence defined on a set of prices P, which is a sublattice of RN, and Q satisfies these two properties, then the set of equilibrium prices Q-1(q) associated with a vector of quantities q is an element of Q is a sublattice of P and...
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作者：Kim, Jaehong; Li, Mengling; Xu, Menghan
作者单位：Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：This paper examines the welfare implications of priority service in a frictional search environment with heterogeneous outside options. Priority search facilitates expedited matching with public options in the market by charging a service premium. Our main analysis demonstrates that a profit-maximizing priority search program always induces the efficient level of market participation. The key insight underpinning our results is the non-monotonic relationship between the priority service premiu...
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作者：Rappoport, Daniel
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：A key feature of communication with evidence is skepticism: a receiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. I study when a change in the receivers prior belief about the sender's evidence induces more skepticism, i.e., induces the receiver, regardless of his preferences, to take an equilibrium action that is less favorable for the sender following every message. I provide a definition of when one receiver's prior belief expects more evidence t...
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作者：Chan, Lester T.
作者单位：Southern University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies a large class of multi-agent contracting models with the property that agents' payoffs constitute a weighted potential game. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents' strategic interactions. I fully characterize a contracting scheme that is optimal for the principal for all equilibrium selection criteria that are more pessimistic than potential maximization. This scheme ranks agents in ascending order of their weights in the weighted potential game and then induces them to ac...
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作者：Lang, Matthias; Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：University of Basel
摘要：We study the welfare effects of ambiguous product information for a buyer with alpha-max-min preferences and a price-setting seller. The buyer privately receives information about her valuation. We show that both the seller and the buyer can benefit when this information is ambiguous, and we characterize all possible combinations of producer and consumer surplus, as evaluated under ambiguity-sensitive preferences. Ambiguity concerning the valuation perceived by the buyer when making the purcha...
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作者：Liao, Xiaoye; Szkup, Michal
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We investigate how differences in initial beliefs and sequential information choices affect the likelihood of coordination failure. To do so, we embed interim information acquisition (i.e., information acquisition after observing initial private information) into a standard global game mode with a normal information structure and improper prior. We find that the likelihood of coordination on welfare-inferior equilibrium is invariant to precision, cost, and availability of information. We show ...
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作者：Galperti, Simone; Perego, Jacopo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Columbia University
摘要：We study equilibrium behavior in incomplete-information games under two information constraints: seeds and spillovers. The former restricts which agents can initially receive information. The latter specifies how this information spills over to other agents. Our main result characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under these constraints, without making additional assumptions about the agents' initial information. This involves deriving a revelation-principle result for settings in which a media...
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作者：Margaria, Chiara
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：I study the efficient design of a queue to dynamically allocate a scarce resource to long-lived agents. Agents can be served multiple times, and their valuations fluctuate over time with some persistence. Each agent privately learns whether his prevailing valuation is high or low only when served. An agent can decide anytime whether to either join a queue of his choice or renege. I show that it is efficient to elicit agents' private information by offering a simple binary menu (i.e., two custo...
