Competitive and revenue-optimal pricing with budgets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Finster, Simon; Goldberg, Paul W.; Lock, Edwin
• 署名单位: Johannes Kepler University Linz; University of Oxford; University of London; King's College London
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5913
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: equilibrium; auction; efficient; mechanism; DESIGN

摘要

In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense or maximize the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a notion of utilitarian efficiency that respects buyers' demands and budgets. Our main contribution establishes that when buyers have linear valuations, competitive equilibrium prices are unique and revenue-optimal for a zero-cost seller.