Dynamic assignment without money: Optimality of spot mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Combe, Julien; Nora, Vladyslav; Tercieux, Olivier
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Nazarbayev University; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE5419
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: approximate competitive-equilibrium; allocation

摘要

We study a large market model of dynamic matching with no monetary transfers and a continuum of agents who have to be assigned items at each date. When the social planner can only elicit ordinal agents' preferences, we prove that under a mild regularity assumption, incentive compatible and ordinally efficient allocation rules coincide with spot mechanisms. The latter specify virtual prices for items at each date and, for each agent, randomly select a budget of virtual money at the beginning of time. When the social planner can elicit cardinal preferences, we prove that under a similar regularity assumption, incentive compatible and Pareto efficient mechanisms coincide with spot menu of random budgets mechanisms. These are similar to spot mechanisms except that, at the beginning of time, each agent chooses within a menu, a distribution over budget of virtual money.