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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru; Hofbauer, Josef
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Princeton University; University of Vienna
摘要：This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a supermodular normal formgame. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone potential maximizer, then the corresponding stationary state is uniquely linearly absorbing and globally accessible for any small degree of friction. A simple example of a unanimity game with three players...
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作者：Scotchmer, Suzanne
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：In a labor market hierarchy, promotions are affected by the noisiness of information about the candidates. I study the hypothesis that males are more risk taking than females, and its implications for rates of promotion and abilities of survivors. I define promotion hierarchies with and without memory, where memory means that promotion depends on the entire history of success. In both types of hierarchies, the surviving risk takers have lower average ability whenever they have a higher surviva...
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作者：Di Tillio, Alfredo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper extends Savage's subjective approach to probability and utility from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic environments. Interactive uncertainty is modeled both explicitly, using hierarchies of preference relations, the analogue of beliefs hierarchies, and implicitly, using preference structures, the analogue of type spaces a la Harsanyi, and it is shown that the two approaches are equivalent. Preference structures can be seen as those sets of hierarch...
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作者：Park, Andreas; Smith, Lones
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：There are two varieties of timing games in economics: wars of attrition, in which having more predecessors helps, and pre-emption games, in which having more predecessors hurts. This paper introduces and explores a spanning class with rank-order payoffs that subsumes both varieties as special cases. We assume time is continuous, actions are unobserved, and information is complete, and explore how equilibria of the games, in which there is shifting between phases of slow and explosive (positive...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：This paper studies repeated games with incomplete information on one side and equal discount factors for both players. The payoffs of the informed player I depend on one of two possible states of the world, which is known to her. The payoffs of the uninformed player U do not depend on the state of the world (that is, U knows his payoffs), but player I's behavior makes knowledge of the state of interest to player U. We define a finitely revealing equilibrium as a Bayesian perfect equilibrium wh...
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作者：Zhao, Rui R.
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：This paper studies bilateral trade in which the seller makes a hidden investment that influences the buyer's hidden valuation. In general it is impossible to implement both first-best efficient trade and efficient investment using budget-balanced trading mechanisms. The paper fully characterizes the constrained efficient contracts. It is shown that the optimal tradeoff between allocative efficiency and incentive provision results in rigidity in trade, the degree of which depends on the serious...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Brown University; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study monopolistic design of a menu of non-linear tariffs when consumers have biased prior beliefs regarding their future preferences. In our model, consumers are optimistic if their prior belief assigns too much weight to states of nature characterized by large gains from trade. A consumer's degree of optimism is his private information, and the monopolist employs the menu of non-linear tariffs to screen it. We characterize the optimal menu and show that the existence of non-common priors ...
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作者：Yang, Huanxing; Ye, Lixin
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This paper considers a nonlinear pricing framework with both horizontally and vertically differentiated products. By endogenizing the set of consumers served in the market, we are able to study how increased competition affects nonlinear pricing, in particular the market coverage and quality distortions. We characterize the symmetric equilibrium menu of price-quality offers under different market structures. When the market structure moves from monopoly to duopoly, we show that more types of c...
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作者：Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：A self-proclaimed expert uses past observations of a stochastic process to make probabilistic predictions about the process. An inspector applies a test function to the infinite sequence of predictions provided by the expert and the observed realization of the process in order to check the expert's reliability. If the test function is Borel and the inspection is such that a true expert always passes it, then it is also manipulable by an ignorant expert. The proof uses Martin's theorem about th...
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作者：Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of Toronto
摘要：We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related incomplete information game with subjective priors. The use of extrapolations in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close to the c...
