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作者：Kartik, Navin; Zhong, Weijie
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints identify the payoff set. The buyer can obtain the entire surplus; often, noninformational mechanisms cannot enlarge the payoff set. We also study payoffs when the buyer is more informed than the seller, and when the buyer is fully informed. All three payoff sets c...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Kuvalear, Aditya V.; Lipnowski, Elliot
作者单位：New York University; University of Essex; Yale University
摘要：We study project selection and development by a principal, interacting with two agents, each of whom wants his respective project selected. When the best choice is uncertain, keeping both projects alive gives the principal the ability to adapt her choice in the future, but implies an efficiency loss of effort being spent on the project finally not chosen. We show that a time-varying threshold rule is uniquely optimal: the principal selects the first project to achieve a sufficient lead. The op...
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作者：Sandmann, Christopher; Bonneton, Nicolas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Vanderbilt University
摘要：This paper proves the existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in the canonical search-and-matching model with heterogeneous agents. Non-stationarity entails that the number and characteristics of unmatched agents evolve endogenously over time. An equilibrium exists under minimal regularity conditions and for both paradigms considered in the literature: transferable and nontransferable utility. To address potential discontinuities in match opportunities across types, our analysis introduces a...
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作者：Bedard, Nicholas C.; Goeree, Jacob K.
作者单位：Wilfrid Laurier University; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We establish the subgradient theorem for monotone correspondences: a monotone correspondence is equal to the subdifferential of a potential if and only if it is conservative, i.e., its integral along a closed path vanishes irrespective of the selection from the correspondence along the path. We prove two attendant results: the potential theorem, whereby a conservative monotone correspondence can be integrated up to a potential, and the duality theorem, whereby the potential has a dual whose su...
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作者：Amendola, Nicola; Araujo, Luis; Ferraris, Leo
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Sapienza University Rome; Michigan State University; Getulio Vargas Foundation; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：This paper compares digital and physical currency, focusing on a single intrinsic difference: digital, unlike physical currency, allows the monetary authority to trace the monetary flows in and out of the accounts. We show that this technological advance in recordkeeping can be used by the monetary authority to improve upon physical currency and achieve efficiency in a wide range of circumstances.
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作者：Bergstrom, Katy; Dodds, William
作者单位：Tulane University
摘要：This paper develops a general theory to recover the inverse welfare function that rationalizes a given tax schedule as optimal. Our theory allows for complex environments including the presence of multidimensional tax schedules, bunching/jumping behavior, optimization frictions, general equilibrium effects, and externalities. We show that inverse welfare functions can be used to test for Pareto efficiency, construct Pareto improving reforms, and characterize the set of welfare improving local ...
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作者：McAdams, David; Song, Yangbo
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：An innovation (e.g., new product or idea) spreads like a virus, transmitted by those who have previously adopted it. Agents update their beliefs about innovation quality based on private signals and when they hear about the innovation. We characterize equilibrium adoption dynamics and the resulting lifecycle of virally-spread innovations. Herding on adoption can occur but only early in the innovation lifecycle, and adoption eventually ceases for all virally-spread innovations. A producer capab...
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作者：Xie, Haitian; Zhu, Ying; Shishkin, Denis
作者单位：Peking University; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：The classic third degree price discrimination (3PD) model requires the knowledge of the distribution of buyer valuations and the covariate to set the price conditioned on the covariate. In terms of generating revenue, the classic result shows that 3PD is at least as good as uniform pricing. What if the seller has to set a price based only on a sample of observations from the underlying distribution? Is it still obvious that the seller should engage in 3PD? This paper sheds light on these funda...
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作者：Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：I study strategic transmission of verifiable information through intermediaries, and find that equilibrium full disclosure requires that all players are biased in the same direction relative to the decision maker. By embedding this strategic disclosure game into networks, I explore the intersection of information transmission in networks and strategic communication-two major economic theory research strands. When each networked player may hold information useful for any other's decision, I fin...
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作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Tokyo
摘要：Matching markets are often fragmented, organized at a small local level. While integration of matching markets may lead to welfare gains by expanding choice, it may also harm some market participants by increasing competition for the same resources. We show that every good mechanism fails the monotonicity requirement that no individuals be hurt by integration. Then we provide characterization results that identify conditions under which monotonicity becomes compatible with other desirable prop...
