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作者：Jacobovic, Royi; Levy, Yehuda John; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Glasgow
摘要：A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite action spaces, bounded payoffs, Polish type spaces, and nested information admit a Bayesian equilibrium.
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies repeated trade with noisy information about previous transactions. A buyer has private information about his willingness to pay, which is either low or high, and buys goods from different sellers over time. Each seller observes a noisy history of signals about the buyer's previous purchases and sets a price. We compare the cases where previous prices are observable to sellers with the case where they are not. We show that, in both cases, more signal precision is counterbalan...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Muller, Stephan; Pourbabaee, Farzad; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Gottingen; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve when agents are mildly condescending. In contrast, too much condescension leads to worse outcomes, as does anti-condescension.
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作者：Hu, Gaoji; Li, Jiangtao; Quah, John K-H.; Tang, Rui
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Singapore Management University; National University of Singapore; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We propose a novel concept of rationalization, called coarse rationalization, tailored for the analysis of datasets where an agent's choices are imperfectly observed. We characterize those datasets, which are rationalizable in this sense and present an efficient algorithm to verify the characterizing condition. We then demonstrate how our results can be applied through a duality approach to test the rationalizability of datasets with perfectly observed choices but imprecisely observed linear b...
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作者：Mekonnen, Teddy
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper examines when the public provision of information in search markets improves welfare. I consider a two-sided frictional search market in which buyers match with vertically differentiated sellers. The market is segmented into submarkets based on seller types. Such segmentation serves as a public signal that buyers use to direct their search. Given a segmentation, I characterize both the socially efficient and the equilibrium allocation of buyers across submarkets, and identify a Hosi...
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作者：Gavan, Malachy James; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：University of Liverpool; Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA
摘要：Implementation theory is concerned with the existence of mechanisms in which, at each state of the world, all equilibria result in outcomes that are within a given social choice correspondence (SCC). However, if agents make mistakes, if their preferences or the solution concept are misspecified, or if the designer is limited in what can be used as punishments, then it may be desirable to insist that also deviations result in acceptable outcomes. Safe implementation adds this extra requirement ...
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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Deakin University
摘要：An extension rule assigns to each fractional tournament x (specifying, for every pair of social alternatives a and b, the proportion x ab of voters who prefer a to b) a random choice function y (specifying a collective choice probability distribution for each subset of alternatives), which chooses a from {a,b} with probability x ab.There exist multiple neutral and stochastically rationalizable extension rules. Both linearity (requiring that y be an affine function of x) and independence of irr...
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作者：Kim, Daehyun; Obara, Ichiro
作者单位：University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper studies how improved monitoring affects the limit equilibrium payoff set for stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. We introduce a simple generalization of Blackwell garbling called weighted garbling in order to compare different monitoring structures for this class of games. Our main result is the monotonicity of the limit perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoff set with respect to this information order. We show that the limit PPE payoff set expands when the monitoring...
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作者：Moeller, Markus
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：In the standard one-to-one agent-object matching model, I consider a central matching authority that publicly announces a strategy-proof mechanism and then initiates a matching. Following Akbarpour and Li (2020), the authority's commitment to the announced mechanism is limited to mechanisms rendering participants' observations indistinguishable from it. I call an announced mechanism transparent if any deviation from it would be detected.The main findings identify trade-offs regarding transpare...
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作者：Curello, Gregorio; Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Oxford
摘要：How best to incentivize prompt disclosure? We study this question in a general model in which a technological breakthrough occurs at an uncertain time and is privately observed by an agent, and a principal must incentivize disclosure via her control of a payoff-relevant physical allocation. We uncover a deadline structure of optimal mechanisms: they have a simple deadline form in an important special case, and a graduated deadline structure in general. We apply our results to the design of une...
