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作者：Moreno-Garcia, Emma; Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo
作者单位：University of Salamanca; Universidad de Chile
摘要：We compare the degree of coalitional manipulability across stable school-choice mechanisms. Although no stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for all school choice contexts, we show that the student-optimal stable mechanism is the least manipulable by coalitions, whereas the school-optimal stable mechanism is the most coalitionally manipulable. These results still hold when students can only report truncated preferences, when the set of coalitions is limited, or when schools cannot be decla...
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作者：Antler, Yair; Bachi, Benjamin
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa
摘要：We develop a model of non-Bayesian decision-making in which an agent obtains a signal about a relevant economic fundamental and subsequently takes an action. To interpret the signal, the agent calibrates a simple prediction rule based on a data set that consists of previous signals and state realizations. Her subsequent action affects the probability with which the current signal and the corresponding state realization will be observed and recorded in the data set that will be used in future d...
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作者：Cheng, Xiaoyu
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：A decision-maker faces uncertainty governed by a data-generating process (DGP), which is only known to belong to a set of sequences of independent but possibly non-identical distributions. A robust decision maximizes the expected payoff against the worst possible DGP in this set. This paper characterizes when and how such robust decisions can be objectively improved with data; that is, can yield higher expected payoffs under the true DGP regardless of which DGP is the truth. It further develop...
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作者：Spiritus, Kevin; Lehmann, Etienne; Renes, Sander; Zoutman, Floris T.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Delft University of Technology; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We analyze the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule for taxpayers with multiple incomes and multiple unobserved characteristics. We identify smoothness assumptions and extensions of the single crossing conditions that enable the characterization of the optimum through variational calculus. Both the tax perturbation and mechanism design approaches yield identical results when the number of incomes equals the number of unobserved characteristics. Notably, the mechanism design approach requires ...
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作者：Ball, Ian; Kattwinkel, Deniz
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; University College London
摘要：We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each test. We characterize whether each type has an associated test that best screens out all other types. If this condition holds, then the testing technology can be represented in a tractable reduced form. We use this reduced form to solve for profit-maximizing ...
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作者：Liu, Zehao; He, Ping; Xie, Chengbo
作者单位：Renmin University of China; Tsinghua University; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：Liquidity requirements for commercial banks improve risk-sharing for depositors. Nevertheless, shadow banks, issuing securities with lower liquidity, operate outside such regulatory constraints. In an economy featuring shadow banks with a constant level of liquidity for shadow bank securities, higher liquidity requirements lead to a reduction in aggregate liquidity provision, owing to regulatory arbitrage incentives. Conversely, when the liquidity of shadow bank securities decreases with the m...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Shaiderman, Dimitry
作者单位：Durham University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In the classical Bayesian persuasion model, an informed player and an uninformed one engage in a static interaction. This work extends this classical model to a dynamic setting where the state of nature evolves according to a Markovian law, allowing for a more realistic representation of real-world situations where the state of nature evolves over time. In this repeated persuasion model, an optimal disclosure strategy of the sender must balance between obtaining a high-stage payoff and disclos...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Roorda, Berend; Yang, Jingni
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Twente; University of Sydney
摘要：We introduce and analyze expected balanced uncertain utility (EBUU) theory. A prior and a balanced outcome-set utility characterize an EBUU decision maker. Conditional on a reference or balancing value, the latter assigns a utility to each outcome-set. The decision maker associates with each act, its envelope, the minimal measurable mapping from states to outcome-sets that contains the act. She then (implicitly) ranks an act according to the balancing value at which the expected balanced utili...
