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作者：Hebert, Benjamin; Zhong, Weijie
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Cambridge
摘要：We investigate the management of information provision to maximize user engagement. A principal sequentially reveals signals to an agent who has a limited amount of information processing capacity and can choose to exit at any time. We identify a dilution strategy-sending rare but highly informative signals-that maximizes user engagement. The platform's engagement metric shapes the direction and magnitude of biases in provided information relative to a user-optimal benchmark. Even without inte...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We analyze the existence of equilibria with complex dynamics in a policy framework with time inconsistency. We consider an economy where, in each period, the policy maker in power determines the level of a durable public good (or bad) that creates strategic linkages across policy periods. When the decision-making process is time consistent-such as when a benevolent planner sets policy in every period-the economy exhibits a unique equilibrium where the state converges to a deterministic steady ...
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作者：Inostroza, Nicolas; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：University of Toronto; Northwestern University
摘要：We study flexible public information design in global games. In addition to receiving public information from the designer, agents are endowed with exogenous private information and must decide between two actions (invest and not invest), the profitability of which depends on unknown fundamentals and the agents' aggregate action. The designer does not trust the agents to play favorably to her and evaluates any policy under the worst-case scenario. First, we show that the optimal policy removes...
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作者：Kamiya, Kazuya; Kubota, So
作者单位：Kobe University; Tohoku University
摘要：We propose a standard search and bargaining model with divisible money, in which only the random matching market opens and the generalized Nash bargaining settles each trade. Assuming fixed production costs, we analytically characterize a tractable equilibrium, called a pay-all equilibrium, and prove its existence. Each buyer pays all the money holding as a corner solution to the bargaining problem and each seller produces a positive amount of goods as an interior solution. The bargaining powe...
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作者：Sanktjohanser, Anna
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：I consider a model of reputational bargaining in which the stubborn type can choose their initial demand. There are two types of players: rational and stubborn. The game has two stages: a demand stage and a concession stage. Types can pool or separate in equilibrium for any fixed probability of facing a stubborn type. When the probability of facing a stubborn type is small, any feasible payoff can be achieved in equilibrium for either type. When the probability is large, there is either immedi...
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作者：Adler, Matthew D.; Bossert, Walter; Cato, Susumu; Kamaga, Kohei
作者单位：Duke University; Universite de Montreal; University of Tokyo; Sophia University
摘要：Although sufficientarianism has been gaining interest as a theory of distributive justice in recent years, it has not been examined in the presence of risk. We propose an ex post approach to sufficientarianism that has a strong link to ex post prioritarianism. Both ex post criteria are based on an axiom that we refer to as prospect independence of the unconcerned, a natural extension of the independence axiom known from the literature that focuses on situations with no risk. We characterize a ...
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作者：Imamura, Kenzo; Kawase, Yasushi
作者单位：University of Tokyo; University of Tokyo
摘要：This study investigates efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints-ordered accessibility-for which the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism is Pareto-efficient (PE), individually rational (IR), and group strategy-proof (GSP). Then we prove that accessibility is a necessary condition for the existence of PE, IR, and GSP mechanisms. Moreover, we show...
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作者：Kostadinov, Rumen
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：I study a dynamic model of durable-good monopoly where the seller minimizes lifetime regret against the worst-case type of buyer. The optimal mechanism is time consistent: at no point can the seller benefit from replacing it with another mechanism. Despite this, the optimal mechanism cannot be supported in an equilibrium without commitment. This is because the seller's regret is endogenously determined by the best counterfactual payoffs he can obtain against every type, and these payoffs vary ...
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
作者单位：University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：A group of agents with a common prior receive informative signals about an unknown state repeatedly over time. If these signals were public, agents' beliefs would be identical and commonly known. This suggests that if signals were private, then the more correlated they are, the greater is the commonality of beliefs. We show that, in fact, the opposite may be true. In the long run, conditionally independent signals may achieve greater commonality of beliefs than correlated signals.
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：In repeated principal-agent problems and games, more outcomes are implementable when performance signals are privately observed by a principal or mediator with commitment power than when the same signals are publicly observed and form the basis of a recursive equilibrium. We investigate the gains from nonrecursive equilibria (e.g., review strategies) based on privately observed signals. Under a pairwise identification condition, we find that the gains from nonrecursive equilibria are small: th...
