A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chung, Kim-Sau; Olszewski, Wojciech
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Hong Kong; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• 发表日期: -2007
• 页码: 469-487
• 关键词: Revenue equivalence; mechanism design; incentive compatibility; non-differentiable approach; connected type space

摘要

We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is equipped with the Euclidean topology. Our sufficient condition is stronger than connectedness but weaker than smooth arcwise connectedness. Our result generalizes all existing revenue equivalence theorems when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. When the set of social alternatives is finite, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition. This condition is similar to, but slightly weaker than, connectedness.