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作者：Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We establish that the fraction of preference profiles for which the random serial dictatorship allocation is ordinally efficient vanishes for allocation problems with many object types. We consider also a probabilistic setting where in expectation agents have moderately similar preferences reflecting varying popularity across objects. In this setting we show that the probability that the random serial dictatorship mechanism is ordinally efficient converges to zero as the number of object types...
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作者：Koriyama, Yukio; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of ...
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作者：Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：When confronted with uncertain prospects, people often exhibit both choice deferral and Ellsberg-type ambiguity aversion. This paper obtains a joint representation for these behavioral phenomena. The decision maker as portrayed by my model is willing to choose an uncertain prospect f over g rather than to defer this choice if and only if the expected utility of f is greater that or equal to the expected utility of g for every probability measure in a convex and closed set Delta. This set is in...
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作者：Damiano, Ettore; Li Hao; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Hong Kong; University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper considers a model of a rating agency with multiple clients, in which each client has a separate market that forms a belief about the quality of the client after the agency issues a rating. When the clients are rated separately (individual rating), the credibility of a good rating in an inflationary equilibrium of the signaling game is limited by the incentive of the agency to exaggerate the quality of the client. With a centralized rating, the agency rates all clients together and s...
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作者：Zhu, Tao
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Glasgow
摘要：This paper formulates equilibrium concepts in the large (nonatomic) household model under the team notion, characterizes a class of equilibrium allocations, explores whether an equilibrium allocation in the large-household model is a limit of equilibrium allocations in the finite-household model, and establishes existence of equilibrium allocations generated by generalized Nash bargaining.
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Harvard University; Princeton University
摘要：This paper analyzes multi-sender cheap talk when the state space might be restricted, either because the policy space is restricted or the set of rationalizable policies of the receiver is not the whole space. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fully-revealing perfect Bayesian equilibrium for any state space. We show that if biases are large enough and are not in similar directions, where the notion of similarity depends on the shape of the state space, then...
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作者：Pavlov, Gregory
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We study a problem of optimal auction design in the realistic case in which the players can collude both on the way they play in the auction and on their participation decisions. Despite the fact that the principal's opportunities for extracting payments from the agents in such a situation are limited, we show how the asymmetry of information between the colluding agents can be used to reduce the revenue losses from collusion. In a class of environments we show that the principal is even able ...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We show by an example that Proposition 2 in Topologies on types by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris [Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 275-309] is not true.
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Noor, Jawwad; Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：Boston University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper models an agent in a multi-period setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided to capture updating biases that reflect excessive weight given to either prior beliefs, or, alternatively, to observed data. A counterpart of the exchangeable Bayesian learning model is also described.
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Weinstein, Jonathan
作者单位：Harvard University; Northwestern University
摘要：Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is inconsistent with the standard model of price competition among identical firms, which predicts that all prices will be driven down to cost. One common explanation for such dispersion is the use of a loss-leader strategy, in which a firm prices one good below cost in order to attract a higher customer volume for profitable goods. By assuming each consumer is forced to buy all desired goods at a single firm, we create the possibility of an effec...
