Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hofbauer, Josef; Sandholm, William H.
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE771
• 发表日期: 2011-09-01
• 页码: 341-377
• 关键词: Evolutionary game theory; evolutionary game dynamics; nonconvergence; dominated strategies

摘要

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.