Condorcet meets Ellsberg

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ellis, Andrew
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1284
• 发表日期: 2016-09-01
• 页码: 865-895
• 关键词: Ambiguity; voting; ELECTIONS; information aggregation

摘要

The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candidate wins goes to 1 as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averseexhibit Ellsberg-type behavioras modeled by maxmin expected utility preferences. It provides sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium probability of the correct candidate winning the election is bounded above by 1/2 in at least one state. As a consequence, there is no equilibrium in which information aggregates.