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作者:Luz, Vitor Farinha
作者单位:University of British Columbia
摘要:This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists. Exact conditions under which the equilibrium involves mixed strategies are provided. The mixed equilibrium features (i) cross-subsidization across risk levels, (ii) dependence of offers on the risk distribution, and (iii) ...
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作者:Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco; Van Long, Ngo; Poschke, Markus
作者单位:McGill University
摘要:There is growing interest in multisector models that combine aggregate balanced growth, consistent with the well known Kaldor facts, with systematic changes in the sectoral allocation of resources, consistent with the Kuznets facts. Although variations in the income elasticity of demand across goods play an important role in initial approaches, recent models stress the role of supply-side factors in this process of structural change, in particular sector-specific technical change and sectoral ...
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作者:Bloise, Gaetano; Polemarchakis, Herakles; Vailakis, Yiannis
作者单位:Yeshiva University; University of Warwick; University of Glasgow
摘要:We show that sovereign debt is unsustainable if debt contracts are not supported by direct sanctions and default carries only a ban from ever borrowing in financial markets even in the presence of uninsurable risks and time-varying interest rate. This extension of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) requires that the present value of the endowment be finite under the most optimistic valuation. We provide examples where this condition fails and sovereign debt is sustained by the threat of loss of insurance...
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作者:Buturak, Gokhan; Evren, Ozgur
作者单位:Stockholm School of Economics; New Economic School
摘要:We propose a model of choice overload, which refers to a stronger tendency to select the default option in larger choice problems. Our main finding is a behavioral characterization of an asymmetric regret representation that depicts a decision maker who does not consider the possibility of experiencing regret for choosing the default option. By contrast, the value of ordinary alternatives is subject to regret. The calculus of regret for ordinary alternatives is identical to that in Sarver's (2...
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作者:Fragiadakis, Daniel; Troyan, Peter
作者单位:Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Virginia
摘要:Distributional constraints are important in many market design settings. Prominent examples include the minimum manning requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts impose constraints on the demographic distribution of students at each school. Standard assignment mechanisms implemented in practice are unable to accommodate these constraints. This leads policymakers to resort to ad hoc solutions that eliminat...
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作者:Iijima, Ryota; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位:Yale University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要:This paper proposes a tractable model that allows us to analyze how agents' perception of relationships with others determines the structures of networks. In our model, agents are endowed with their own multidimensional characteristics and their payoffs depend on the social distance between them. We characterize the clustering coefficient and average path length in stable networks, and analyze how they are related to the way agents measure social distances. The model predicts the small-world p...
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作者:Dziubinski, Marcin; Goyal, Sanjeev
作者单位:University of Warsaw; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要:Modern economies rely heavily on their infrastructure networks. These networks face threats ranging from natural disasters to human attacks. As networks are pervasive, the investments needed to protect them are very large; this motivates the study of targeted defense. What are the key nodes to defend to maximize functionality of the network? What are the incentives of individual nodes to protect themselves in a networked environment and how do these incentives correspond to collective welfare?...
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作者:Khan, Mohammed Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Yu, Haomiao; Zhang, Yongchao
作者单位:Johns Hopkins University; University of Notre Dame; Toronto Metropolitan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要:The theory of large one-shot simultaneous-play games with a biosocial typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms-large individualized games (LIG) and large distributionalized games (LDG), respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a single trait in which some Nash equilibrium distributions cannot be induced by the Nash equilibria of the representing LIG, this paper offers three equivalence results that delineate a relationship between...
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作者:Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
摘要:This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. Effort levels at different times are strategic substitutes and, as a result, the unique equilibrium effort and wage paths are single-peaked with seniority. Moreover, for any wage profile, the agent works too little, too late. Commitme...
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作者:Ye, Lixin; Zhang, Chenglin
作者单位:University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要:We consider consumer entry in the canonical monopolistic nonlinear pricing model (Mussa and Rosen 1978) wherein consumers learn their preference types after incurring privately known entry costs. We show that by taking into account consumer entry, the nature of optimal nonlinear pricing contracts changes significantly: compared to the benchmark without costly entry, in our model both quality distortion and market exclusion are reduced, sorting is more likely, and whenever bunching occurs, the ...