Efficient networks in games with local complementarities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Belhaj, Mohamed; Bervoets, Sebastian; Deroian, Frederic
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1742
• 发表日期: 2016-01-01
• 页码: 357-380
• 关键词: Network games; strategic complementarity; nested split graphs

摘要

We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of nested split graphs. Next, we refine our results and find that, depending on the specification of the network cost function, complete networks, core-periphery networks, dominant group architectures, quasi-star networks, and quasi-complete networks can be efficient.