Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chan, Jimmy H.; Zhang, Wenzhang
• 署名单位: Fudan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1369
• 发表日期: 2016-01-01
• 页码: 53-87
• 关键词: Repeated games; private monitoring; COMMUNICATION

摘要

Side-payments are common in many long-term relationships. We show that when players can exchange side-payments, approximate efficiency is achievable in any repeated game with private monitoring and communication, as long as the players can observe their own payoffs and are sufficiently patient, the efficient stage-game outcome is unique, and the signal distribution has full support. Unlike existing results in the literature, our result does not require deviations to be statistically detectable.