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作者：Austen-Smith, David; Dziuda, Wioletta; Harstad, Bard; Loeper, Antoine
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Chicago; University of Oslo; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple legislative veto players and show that inefficient policy instruments are politically easier to repeal than efficient instruments. Anticipating this, heterogeneous legislators agree more readily on an inefficien...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Bonn
摘要：For a partnership model with general type distributions and interdependent values, we derive the optimal dissolution mechanisms that, for arbitrary initial ownership, maximize any convex combination of revenue and social surplus. The solution involves ironing around typically interior worst-off types, which are endogenously determined. The optimal ownership structures are such that, with identical distributions, equal shares are always optimal. With nonidentical distributions, the optimal shar...
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作者：Au, Pak Hung
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：An agent searches sequentially for advice from multiple experts concerning the payoff of taking an operation. After incurring a positive search cost, the agent can consult an expert whose interest is partially aligned with him. There are infinitely many experts, each has access to an identically and conditionally independent signal structure about the payoff, and each makes a recommendation after observing the signal realization. We find that the experts face a loser's curse, which could hampe...
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作者：Silva, Francisco
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type affects only the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, that can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's report. I define renegotiation-proof mechanisms and characterize the optimal one. The main finding of this paper is that the optimal renegotiation-proof mechanism induces pooling at the top, i.e., types abov...
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作者：Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
作者单位：University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of epsilon-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (epsilon-CCE) of the underlying one-shot game. The value of epsilon depends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with cheap talk that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside ...
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作者：Eguia, Jon X.; Nicolo, Antonio
作者单位：Michigan State University; University of Padua; University of Manchester
摘要：We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific constituencies, which can reduce aggregate welfare.
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作者：Block, Juan I.; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：We study models of learning in games where agents with limited memory use social information to decide when and how to change their play. When agents observe only the aggregate distribution of payoffs and recall only information from the last period, aggregate play comes close to Nash equilibrium for generic games, and pure equilibria are generally more stable than mixed equilibria. When agents observe both the payoff distribution of other agents and the actions that led to those payoffs, and ...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos
摘要：We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing...
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作者：Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe actions and noisy public information about a hidden state each period. We find a general condition under which the feasible and individually rational payoff set is invariant to the initial prior about the state when players are patient. This result ensures that players can punish or reward their opponents via continuation payoffs in a flexible way. Then we prove the folk theorem, assuming that public randomization is...
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作者：Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan F.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Universidad de Chile
摘要：We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work, and renders the implications and predictions of a model m...
