Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan F.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Universidad de Chile
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3230
• 发表日期: 2019-05-01
• 页码: 597-646
• 关键词: Dynamic stochastic games; timing of decisions; COMMITMENT; protocol invariance

摘要

We characterize a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that these widely used models are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. Protocol invariance can facilitate applied work, and renders the implications and predictions of a model more robust. Our class of dynamic stochastic games includes investment games, research and development races, models of industry dynamics, dynamic public contribution games, asynchronously repeated games, and many other models from the extant literature.