Renegotiation-proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Silva, Francisco
• 署名单位: Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3190
• 发表日期: 2019-07-01
• 页码: 971-1014
• 关键词: Renegotiation proof; mechanism design; verification

摘要

I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type affects only the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, that can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's report. I define renegotiation-proof mechanisms and characterize the optimal one. The main finding of this paper is that the optimal renegotiation-proof mechanism induces pooling at the top, i.e., types above a certain threshold report to be the largest type, while types below the threshold report truthfully.