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作者：Frankel, Alex; Kartik, Navin
作者单位：University of Chicago; Columbia University
摘要：How much information should a central bank (CB) have about (i) policy objectives and (ii) operational shocks to the effect of monetary policy? We consider a version of the Barro-Gordon credibility problem in which monetary policy signals an inflation-biased CB's private information on both these dimensions. We find that greater CB competence-more private information-about policy objectives is desirable while greater competence about operational shocks need not be. When the CB has less private ...
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作者：Nishimura, Hiroki
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：In this paper, we study methods of inferring a decision maker's true preference relation when observed choice data reveal a nontransitive preference relation due to choice mistakes. We propose some sensible properties of such methods and show that these properties characterize a unique rule of inference, called the transitive core. This rule is applied to a variety of nontransitive preference models, such as semiorders on the commodity space, relative discounting time preferences, justifiable ...
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作者：Chade, Hector; Eeckhout, Jan
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of London; University College London; Pompeu Fabra University; ICREA; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We analyze the optimal allocation of experts to teams, where experts differ in the precision of their information, and study the assortative matching properties of the resulting assignment. The main insight is that in general it is optimal to diversify the composition of the teams, ruling out positive assortative matching. This diversification leads to negative assortative matching when teams consist of pairs of experts. And when experts' signals are conditionally independent, all teams have s...
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作者：Bardhi, Arjada; Guo, Yingni
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends on all voters' states. The sender makes the most demanding voters indifferent between decisions, while the more lenient voters strictly benefit from persuasion. Unde...
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作者：Heifetz, Aviad; Kets, Willemien
作者单位：Open University Israel; University of Oxford
摘要：Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that no refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refinements do exist if we relax the assumption that all players are unlimited in their reasoning ability. In particular, for a class of models, every strict Bayesian-Nash equilibr...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; De Rock, Bram
作者单位：KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We define necessary and sufficient conditions on prices and incomes under which quantity choices can violate SARP (strong axiom of revealed preference) but not WARP (weak axiom of revealed preference). As SARP extends WARP by additionally imposing transitivity on the revealed preference relation, this effectively defines the conditions under which transitivity adds bite to the empirical analysis. For finite data sets, our characterization takes the form of a triangular condition that must hold...
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作者：Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also show how this...
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作者：Azar, Pablo D.; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Collecting and processing large amounts of data is becoming increasingly crucial in our society. We model this task as evaluating a function f over a large vector x = (x(1), ..., x(n)), which is unknown, but drawn from a publicly known distribution X. In our model, learning each component of the input x is costly, but computing the output f(x) has zero cost once x is known. We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to delegate the evaluation of f to an agent whose cost of learning any ...
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作者：Liu, Heng
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper addresses the problem of implementing socially efficient allocations in dynamic environments with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. In the case where the agents' information is correlated across time, we construct efficient and incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanisms. Unlike the mechanisms with history-independent transfers in the existing literature, these mechanisms feature history-dependent transfers. Moreover, they are reminiscent of the classica...
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作者：Stovall, John E.
作者单位：Brigham Young University
摘要：We model a decision maker who anticipates being tempted but is also uncertain about what is normatively best. Our model is an extended version of Gul and Pesendorfer's (2001) with three time periods: in the ex ante period, the agent chooses a set of menus; in the interim period, she chooses a menu from this set; in the final period, she chooses from the menu. We posit axioms from the ex ante perspective. Our main axioms on preference state that the agent prefers flexibility in the ex ante peri...
