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作者：Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions under which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies. The results have implicatio...
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作者：Tierney, Ryan
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark
摘要：We identify a large subdomain, ?, of quasilinear economies on which any efficient exchange rule will be generically (in the Baire sense) manipulable. For generic economies outside of ?, we find rules that are locally non-manipulable. The interior of the set ? consists of all economies in which competitive equilibrium would prescribe that all agents consume a positive quantity of money. Since we study quasilinear preferences, this is the domain of primary interest. Our locally non-manipulable r...
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作者：Elliott, Matthew; Nava, Francesco
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper studies market clearing in matching markets. The model is non-cooperative, fully decentralized, and in Markov strategies. Workers and firms bargain with each other to determine who will be matched with whom and at what terms of trade. Once a worker-firm pair reaches agreement, they exit the market. Alternative possible matches affect agents' bargaining positions. We ask under which conditions such markets clear efficiently and find that inefficienciesmismatch and delayfeature freque...
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作者：Galperti, Simone
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Prominent research argues that consumers often use personal budgets to manage self-control problems. This paper analyzes the link between budgeting and self-control problems in consumption-saving decisions. It shows that the use of good-specific budgets depends on the combination of a demand for commitment and the demand for flexibility resulting from uncertainty about intratemporal trade-offs between goods. It explains the subtle mechanism that renders budgets useful commitments, their intera...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanie, Francois
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; INRAE
摘要：We study a discriminatory limit-order book in which market makers compete in nonlinear tariffs to serve a privately informed insider. Our model allows for general nonparametric specifications of preferences and arbitrary discrete distributions for the insider's private information. Adverse selection severely restricts equilibrium outcomes: in any pure-strategy equilibrium with convex tariffs, pricing must be linear and at most one type can trade, leading to an extreme form of market breakdown....
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Yenmez, M. Bumin
摘要：Increasingly, more school districts across the United States are using centralized admissions for charter, magnet, and neighborhood schools in a common enrollment system. We first show that across all school-participation patterns, full participation in the common (or unified) enrollment system leads to the most preferred outcome for students. Second, we show that, in general, participation by all schools may not be achievable because schools have incentives to stay out. This may explain why s...
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作者：Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：I study the optimal choice of projects in a continuous-time moral hazard model with multitasking. I characterize the distortions caused by moral hazard and the dynamics of the firm's project choice. Both overinvestment and underinvestment relative to a net present value (NPV) criterion can occur on the path of the contract. As past performance increases, the firm chooses projects that require higher pay-performance sensitivity. When the continuation value is large, investment projects are chos...
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作者：Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Nichifor, Alexandru; Ostrovsky, Michael; Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Melbourne; Stanford University; University of Cologne
摘要：Various forms of substitutability are essential for establishing the existence of equilibria and other useful properties in diverse settings such as matching, auctions, and exchange economies with indivisible goods. We extend earlier models' definitions of substitutability to settings in which each agent can be both a buyer in some transactions and a seller in others, and show that all these definitions are equivalent. We then introduce a new class of substitutable preferences that allows us t...
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作者：Richter, Michael; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：We suggest a concept of convexity of preferences that does not rely on any algebraic structure. A decision maker has in mind a set of orderings interpreted as evaluation criteria. A preference relation is defined to be convex when it satisfies the following condition: If, for each criterion, there is an element that is both inferior to b by the criterion and superior to a by the preference relation, then b is preferred to a. This definition generalizes the standard Euclidean definition of conv...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Bonn; University of Toronto
摘要：We study a multidimensional collective decision under incomplete information. Agents have Euclidean preferences and vote by simple majority on each issue (dimension), yielding the coordinate-wise median. Judicious rotations of the orthogonal axes-the issues that are voted upon-lead to welfare improvements. If the agents' types are drawn from a distribution with independent marginals, then under weak conditions, voting on the original issues is not optimal. If the marginals are identical (but n...
