-
作者：Koessler, Frederic; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study the informed-principal problem in a bilateral asymmetric information trading setting with interdependent values and quasi-linear utilities. The informed seller proposes a mechanism and voluntarily certifies information about the good's characteristics. When the set of certifiable statements is sufficiently rich, we show that there is an ex ante profit-maximizing selling procedure that is an equilibrium of the mechanism proposal game. In contrast to posted price settings, the allocatio...
-
作者：Perez-Nievas, Mikel; Conde-Ruiz, Jose I.; Gimenez, Eduardo L.
作者单位：Universidade de Santiago de Compostela; Complutense University of Madrid; Universidade de Vigo
摘要：This paper explores the properties of the notions of A-efficiency and P-efficiency, which were proposed by Golosov et al. (2007), to evaluate allocations in a general overlapping generations setting in which fertility choices are endogenously selected from a continuum and any two agents of the same generation are identical. First, we show that the properties of A-efficient allocations vary depending on the criterion used to identify potential agents. If one identifies potential agents by their...
-
作者：Deb, Joyee; Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio
作者单位：Yale University; Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
摘要：We study impersonal exchange and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's dilemma. We show that cooperation can be sustained quite generally, using community enforcement and trust-building. The latter refers to an initial phase in which one community builds trust by not deviating des...
-
作者：Meyer, Margaret; de Barreda, Ines Moreno; Nafziger, Julia
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Oxford; Aarhus University
摘要：This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver, and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias vectors. With the supports of the biases represented by cones, we prove that whenever there exists an equilibrium that fully reveals the state, there exists a robust fully revealing equilibrium (FRE), i...
-
作者：Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Warwick; Ashoka University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We analyze the formation of partnerships in social networks. Players need favors at random times and ask their neighbors in the network to form exclusive long-term partnerships that guarantee reciprocal favor exchange. Refusing to provide a favor results in the automatic removal of the underlying link. Players agree to provide the first favor in a partnership only if they otherwise face the risk of eventual isolation. In equilibrium, players essential for realizing every maximum matching can a...
-
作者：Kambe, Shinsuke
作者单位：Gakushuin University
摘要：This paper studies an N-person war of attrition that needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, may the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition change over time. We introduce the possibility of a noncompromising type and characterize the unique equilibrium by identifying which players are actively involved in a war of attrition at each moment. We examine who is likely to exit and ...
-
作者：Massari, Filippo
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：In a general equilibrium model with a continuum of traders and bounded aggregate endowment, I investigate the market selection hypothesis that markets favor traders with accurate beliefs. Contrary to known results for economies with (only) finitely many traders, I find that risk attitudes affect traders' survival and that markets can favor lucky traders with incorrect beliefs over skilled traders with accurate beliefs. My model allows for a clear distinction between luck and skills, and it sho...
-
作者：Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey; Stole, Lars A.
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Ottawa; University of Chicago
摘要：We characterize the complete set of equilibrium allocations to an intrinsic common agency screening game as the set of solutions to self-generating optimization programs. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes for regular environments by relying on techniques developed elsewhere for aggregate games and for the mechanism design delegation literature. The set of equilibria includes those with nondifferentiable payoffs and discontinuous choices, as well as equilibria that ...
-
作者：Rocheteau, Guillaume; Weill, Pierre-Olivier; Wong, Tsz-Nga
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：We construct a continuous-time new-monetarist economy that displays an endogenous, nondegenerate distribution of money holdings. Properties of equilibria are obtained analytically and equilibria are solved in closed form in a variety of cases. Lump-sum transfers financed with money creation are welfare-enhancing when labor productivity is low whereas regressive transfers approach first best when labor productivity is high and agents are not too impatient. We introduce illiquid government bonds...
-
作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Safronov, Mikhail
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Cambridge
摘要：We study a class of chip strategies in repeated games of incomplete information. This class generalizes the strategies studied by Mobius () in the context of a favor-exchange model and the strategies studied in our companion paper, Olszewski and Safronov (). In two-player games, if players have private values and their types evolve according to independent Markov chains, then under very mild conditions on the stage game, the efficient outcome can be approximated by chip-strategy equilibria whe...
