Communication and cooperation in repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3049
• 发表日期: 2019-05-01
• 页码: 513-553
• 关键词: Repeated games; private monitoring; COMMUNICATION

摘要

We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of epsilon-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (epsilon-CCE) of the underlying one-shot game. The value of epsilon depends on the discount factor and the quality of monitoring. We then identify conditions under which there are equilibria with cheap talk that result in nearly efficient payoffs outside the set epsilon-CCE. Thus, in our model, communication is necessary for cooperation.