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作者：Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：We study dynamic contracting with adverse selection and limited commitment. A firm (the principal) and a worker (the agent) interact for potentially infinitely many periods. The worker is privately informed about his productivity and the firm can only commit to short-term contracts. The ratchet effect is in place since the firm has the incentive to change the terms of trade and offer more demanding contracts when it learns that the worker is highly productive. As the parties become arbitrarily...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Many sales, sports, and research contests are put in place to maximize contestants' performance. We investigate and provide a complete characterization of the prize structures that achieve this objective in settings with many contestants. The contestants may be ex ante asymmetric in their abilities and prize valuations, and there may be complete or incomplete information about these parameters. The prize valuations and performance costs may be linear, concave, or convex. A main novel takeaway ...
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作者：Basu, Pathikrit; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the degree of falsifiability of theories of choice. A theory is easy to falsify if relatively small data sets are enough to guarantee that the theory can be falsified: the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension of a theory is the largest sample size for which the theory is never falsifiable. VC dimension is motivated strategically. We consider a model with a strategic proponent of a theory and a skeptical consumer, or user, of theories. The former presents experimental evidence in favor o...
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作者：Baisa, Brian
作者单位：Amherst College
摘要：I study multiunit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that re...
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作者：Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL); Princeton University
摘要：We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a trade-off between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher-quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In discretionary settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium, but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify the welfare gai...
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作者：Bervoets, Sebastian; Bravo, Mario; Faure, Mathieu
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Universidad de Santiago de Chile
摘要：While payoff-based learning models are almost exclusively devised for finite action games, where players can test every action, it is harder to design such learning processes for continuous games. We construct a stochastic learning rule, designed for games with continuous action sets, which requires no sophistication from the players and is simple to implement: players update their actions according to variations in own payoff between current and previous action. We then analyze its behavior i...
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作者：Szkup, Michal
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper provides a general analysis of comparative statics results in global games. I show that the effect of a change in any parameter of a global game model of regime change can be decomposed into a direct effect, which captures the effect of a change in parameters when agents' beliefs are held constant, and a multiplier effect, which captures the role of adjustments in agents' beliefs. I characterize conditions under which the multiplier effect is strong and relate it to the strength of ...
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作者：Noda, Shunya
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the planner observes a public signal about the agent's type after a type-contingent allocation is chosen. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction (strong detectability) and f...
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作者：Foerster, Manuel
作者单位：University of Hamburg
摘要：We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize myopic (best response) equilibria as well as fully informative myopic equilibria. Second, we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a fully informative farsighted (perfect Bayesian) equili...
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作者：Faro, Jose Heleno; Lefort, Jean-Philippe
作者单位：Insper; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We characterize prior-by-prior Bayesian updating using a model proposed by Gilboa, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Schmeidler (2010) that jointly considers objective and subjective rationality. These rationality concepts are subject to the Bewley unanimity rule and maxmin expected utility, respectively, with a common set of priors and the same utility over consequences. We use this setup with two preference relations to develop a novel rationale for full Bayesian updating of maxmin expected utility...
