Information and targeted spending

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eguia, Jon X.; Nicolo, Antonio
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; University of Padua; University of Manchester
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2508
• 发表日期: 2019-05-01
• 页码: 373-402
• 关键词: Local public goods; INFORMATION; ELECTIONS; targeted spending

摘要

We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific constituencies, which can reduce aggregate welfare.