Efficient multiunit auctions for normal goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baisa, Brian
• 署名单位: Amherst College
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE3430
• 发表日期: 2020-01-01
• 页码: 361-413
• 关键词: Multiunit auctions; multidimensional mechanism design; wealth effects

摘要

I study multiunit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desired properties of the Vickrey auction if there are two bidders who have single-dimensional types. I also present an impossibility theorem that shows that there is no mechanism that satisfies Vickrey's desired properties and weak budget balance when bidders have multidimensional types.