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作者：Li, Yunan
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：A principal distributes an indivisible good to budget-constrained agents when both valuation and budget are agents' private information. The principal can verify an agent's budget at a cost. The welfare-maximizing mechanism can be implemented via a two-stage scheme. First, agents report their budgets, receive cash transfers, and decide whether to enter a lottery over the good. Second, recipients of the good can sell it on a resale market but must pay a sales tax. Low-budget agents receive a hi...
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作者：Loisel, Olivier
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：In locally linearized dynamic stochastic rational-expectations models, I introduce the concepts of feasible paths (paths on which the policy instrument can be expressed as a function of the policymaker's observation set) and implementable paths (paths that can be obtained, in a minimally robust way, as the unique local equilibrium under a policy-instrument rule consistent with the policymaker's observation set). I show that, for relevant observation sets, the optimal feasible path under moneta...
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作者：Kotowski, Maciej H.
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget constraints. Focusing on the two-bidder case, we identify new sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. In equilibrium, agents may adopt discontinuous bidding strategies that result in a stratification of competition along the budget dimension. Private budgets can simultaneously lead to more aggressive bidding (a high-budget agent leverages his wealth to outb...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Hu, Gaoji
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and each firm cares about the type of her employee under a match. Moreover, firms' information structure is described by partitions over possible worker type profiles. With this firm-specific information, we propose a stability notion which, in addition to requiring individual rationality and no blocking pairs, captures the idea...
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作者：Li, Anqi; Yang, Ming
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Duke University
摘要：Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring technology that governs the above procedure is part of the designer's strategic planning. In otherwise standard principal-agent models with moral hazard, we allow the principal to partition agents' performance data into any finite categories, and to pay for the amoun...
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作者：Dasaratha, Krishna; He, Kevin
作者单位：Harvard University; California Institute of Technology; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study a sequential-learning model featuring a network of naive agents with Gaussian information structures. Agents apply a heuristic rule to aggregate predecessors' actions. They weigh these actions according the strengths of their social connections to different predecessors. We show this rule arises endogenously when agents wrongly believe others act solely on private information and thus neglect redundancies among observations. We provide a simple linear formula expressing agents' action...
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作者：Arseneau, David M.; Rappoport, David E. W.; Vardoulakis, Alexandros P.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：We show that trade frictions in over-the-counter (OTC) markets result in inefficient private liquidity provision. We develop a dynamic model of market-based financial intermediation with a two-way interaction between primary credit markets and secondary OTC markets. Private allocations are generically inefficient due to a congestion externality operating through market liquidity in the OTC market. This inefficiency can lead to liquidity that is suboptimally low or high compared to the second b...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo; Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：Stanford University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We study repeated games in which players learn the unknown state of the world by observing a sequence of noisyprivatesignals. We find that for generic signal distributions, the folk theorem obtains using ex post equilibria. In our equilibria, playerscommonlylearn the state, that is, the state becomes asymptotic common knowledge.
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作者：Heumann, Tibor
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：We study a principal-agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative rents ex post. We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism. In that optimal mechanism, learning proceeds in continuous time and, at each moment, the agent learns a lower bound on his type. For each type...
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作者：Golosov, Mikhail; Menzio, Guido
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
摘要：We develop a theory of endogenous and stochastic fluctuations in economic activity. Individual firms choose to randomize over firing or keeping workers who performed poorly in the past to give them an ex ante incentive to exert effort. Different firms choose to correlate the outcome of their randomization to reduce the probability with which they fire nonperforming workers. Correlated randomization leads to aggregate fluctuations. Aggregate fluctuations are endogenous-they emerge because firms...
