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作者：Barron, Daniel; Georgiadis, George; Swinkels, Jeroen
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean-preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk-taking, the principal optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, this concavity constraint binds and so linear contracts maximize profit. If the agent is risk averse, the concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show ho...
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作者：Nirei, Makoto; Stachurski, John; Watanabe, Tsutomu
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Australian National University
摘要：This study provides an explanation for the emergence of power laws in asset trading volume and returns. We consider a two-state model with binary actions, where traders infer other traders' private signals regarding the value of an asset from their actions and adjust their own behavior accordingly. We prove that this leads to power laws for equilibrium volume and returns whenever the number of traders is large and the signals for asset value are sufficiently noisy. We also provide numerical re...
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作者：Erlanson, Albin; Kleiner, Andreas
作者单位：University of Essex; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information; the principal cannot use monetary transfers to elicit this information, but can verify an agent's claim at a cost. We characterize the mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the principal. This mechanism can be implemented as a cardinal voting rule,...
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作者：He Wei; Sun Yeneng
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite- or infinite-horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e., almost perfect information), which go beyond previous works in the sense that stagewise public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. For alte...
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作者：Asseyer, Andreas
作者单位：Free University of Berlin
摘要：This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information, and the supervisor and agent may collude. I show that the principal optimally delegates the interaction with the agent to the supervisor if either the supervisor's budget is large or the value of production is small. T...
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作者：Dindo, Pietro; Massari, Filippo
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Bocconi University; University of East Anglia
摘要：The wisdom of the crowd applied to financial markets asserts that prices represent a consensus belief that is more accurate than individual beliefs. However, a market selection argument implies that prices eventually reflect only the beliefs of the most accurate agent. In this paper, we show how to reconcile these alternative points of view. In markets in which agents naively learn from equilibrium prices, a dynamic wisdom of the crowd holds. Market participation increases agents' accuracy, an...
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作者：Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter
作者单位：University of Virginia
摘要：We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially informed students. We show that, in general, the commonly used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse off. We attribute these results to acurse of acceptance. However, we also show that if priorities are designed appropriately, positive results are recovered: equilibrium strategies are simple, the outcome...
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作者：Bianchi, Milo; Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study banks' incentive to pool assets of heterogeneous quality when investors evaluate pools by extrapolating from limited sampling. Pooling assets of heterogeneous quality induces dispersion in investors' valuations without affecting their average. Prices are determined by market clearing assuming that investors can neither borrow nor short-sell. A monopolistic bank has the incentive to create heterogeneous bundles only when investors have enough money. When the number of banks is sufficie...
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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; Dillenberger, David; Ortoleva, Pietro
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Pennsylvania; Princeton University; Princeton University
摘要：One of the most well known models of non-expected utility is Gul's (1991) model of disappointment aversion. This model, however, is defined implicitly, as the solution to a functional equation; its explicit utility representation is unknown, which may limit its applicability. We show that an explicit representation can be easily constructed, using solely the components of the implicit representation. We also provide a more general result: an explicit representation for preferences in the betwe...
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作者：Kovach, Matthew
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：Considerable evidence shows that people have optimistic beliefs about future outcomes. I present an axiomatic model of wishful thinking (WT), in which an endowed alternative, or status quo, influences the agent's beliefs over states and thus induces such optimism. I introduce a behavioral axiom formalizing WT and derive a representation in which the agent overweights states in which the endowment provides a higher payoff. WT is a novel channel through which an endowment may influence choice be...
